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Abstract
Horizontal-merger price simulations, which rely upon pre-merger data to predict post-merger prices, have been
proposed and used in antitrust policymaking. However, a dearth of closely observed large mergers in differentiated-
product industries makes empirical investigations of simulation performance extremely difficult, and raises many
questions regarding the accuracy of simulation performance. Although a handful of previous studies exist, they
focus on short-term simulation performances and ignore long-run effects of mergers. This research investigates
the long-run simulation performance and long-run pricing effects of merger in the Korean automobile industry for
the period 1991–2010. This period saw the merger of Hyundai and Kia Motors in 1998, a merger caused by the
Asian economic crisis and which resulted in the conglomeration of 70 percent of the Korean automobile market.
By taking Nevo’s (2000, 2001) method as a base and measuring its performance against this real-world merger,
I find that post-merger prices can be predicted reasonably well in the short term, but that large discrepancies
appear in the long-run simulation. To account for this discrepancy, I confirm four further factors that appear
essential to move toward a more accurate post-merger price simulation model: change in marginal costs, change
in product lines, and change in consumer incomes and preferences. I counterfactually investigate each factor’s
contribution to price change, confirming their significance. In my investigation I estimate consumer preferences
and substitution patterns leading up to the merger, then I calculate marginal costs, and simulate post-merger
prices. In addition, I estimate automobile assembly plant-level production functions to evaluate merger synergy
effects. By incorporating changes in the four factors I mention, I can account for 61 percent of the long-run price
discrepancies.
Keywords and Phrases: Oligopoly, Differentiated Product, Horizontal Merger, Ex-Post Evaluation
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1 Introduction
Horizontal merger policy evaluations have been a central agenda in industrial organization. Not only have they
served as an active field of research, but they also play a vital role in supporting antitrust policymaking. Because
social welfare losses directly result from poor merger policy decisions, both academic researchers and antitrust
agencies have paid significant attention to merger policy evaluations. In line with this social importance, economists
have put an enormous amount of research effort into such various aspects as merger incentives, merger synergies,
capacity expansions, and simulations for post-merger market consequences from both theoretical and empirical
perspectives.
From an academic perspective, the horizontal merger analyses in homogeneous product industries have been
a successful area wherein economic researchers have provided rich evaluation tools for both realized and potential
mergers. Starting from a simple theoretical Cournot model (Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds, 1983) to a sophisti-
cated dynamic model (Gowrisankaran, 1999), researchers are now well-equipped to investigate diversified aspects of
horizontal mergers. In addition, a sizable body of literature represents retrospective studies on observed mergers
in homogeneous product industries, including such industries as the US steel industry (Stigler, 1950), the Italian
banking industry (Focarelli and Panetta, 2003), the European bottled water industry (Compete, Jenny, and Rey,
2002), and the U.S. feminine hygiene goods industry (Weinberg, 2011)1.
In contrast, both the theoretical and the empirical literatures on horizontal mergers in differentiated-product
industries are scant. In theoretical analysis, researchers inevitably characterize differentiated-product industries
using Bertrand price competitions2. Since firms choose multiple prices, economic modeling analyses tend to be
quite challenging3. In empirical analysis, differentiated-product firms tend to be either large-sized firms or firms
that are locally concentrated, given their abilities to supply multi-differentiated products. As such, proposed merg-
ers are likely to be challenged and blocked by local antitrust authorities45. Although researchers have proposed a
small number of vital merger-evaluation tools, e.g. Nevo (2000, 2001), the dearth of empirical horizontal-merger
observations in large differentiated-product industries inhibits investigation into these proposed tools’ performance.
The left side of Figure 1 depicts the fundamental difficulty in the empirical horizontal-merger literature. Since
researchers cannot observe post-merger market consequences when mergers are blocked, they are unable to inves-
tigate the performances of Nevo’s simulation method for these mergers6. Consequently, there are only a handful
1 See Werden and Froeb (2008) for more homogeneous industry merger examples.
2 Cournot quantity competition model cannot well-describe differentiated product industries, as it assumes centralized spot markets
(or assumes the existence of market auctioneers) that provide prices for each differentiated product.
3 The exception is a static Bertrand model in which researchers can derive first-order necessary conditions. This research relies
on such a static Bertrand framework. Dynamic extensions of differentiated-product industry mergers are also challenging due to the
emergence of multiple equilibria which compromises the models’ policy implications.
4 Such challenged or blocked merger examples in the United States in recent years include: Rite Ade–Reveco (1996, localized drug
store industry), Staples–Office Depot (1997, localized office goods supply industry), Nestle–Dreyer’s (2003, ice cream industry), Tenet–
Slidell (2003, localized hospital industry), General Mills–Phillsbury (2001, baking ingredient industry), Air Products–L’Air Liquide
(2000, industrial gas supplier industry), Fortune Brands–Allied Domecq (2005, premium bourbon industry). See more examples in the
Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines by the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (2006).
5 Here exists another difficulty: Researchers usually obtain only price data in observed differentiated-product industry mergers. This
presents a difficulty for empirical researchers who are unable to implement structural analyses that inevitably require sales quantity data.
Empirical researchers try to use price-only data wisely to obtain merger-policy implications. See Ashenfelter, Hosken, and Weinberg
(Working Paper) [3] for such use of price-only data.
6 More precisely, an investigation on the simulation performance inevitably requires following conditions: (1) a merger was realized;
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Figure 1: Left figure: Research with a blocked/retreated merger, Right figure: This research (outline)
of realized-merger case studies relating to differentiated-product industries that can be reliably used in antitrust
policymaking.
Thus, in order to expand on the available literature regarding differentiated-product horizontal mergers, this
paper investigates one specific merge that came from the Asian economic crisis7. Using a dataset that includes
observations on post-merger market consequences, I evaluate the reliability of and potential improvements to Nevo’s
(2000, 2001) post-merger price simulation method8. In particular, I examine vehicle pricing in the Korean automo-
bile industry for the period 1991–2010. This period saw a large horizontal merger between two differentiated-product
firms, Hyundai and Kia Motors (in November 1998), a merger that conglomerated 70 percent of the Korean au-
tomobile market. The right side of Figure 1 outlines the framework of this research. First, I estimate consumer
preference and substitution patterns leading up to the merger. Second, I calculate marginal costs under a static
Bertrand price competition framework. Third, I use these estimated preference and calculated marginal costs to
simulate post-merger prices. I find that one can reasonably predict post-merger prices well in the short term9;
however, large discrepancies appear in the long run. Fourth, I use observed post-merger consumer incomes and
preferences, marginal costs, and product lines to account for discrepancies between simulated and observed prices.
(2) both pre-merger and post-merger market data are available; (3) both price and sales quantity data are available; (4) post-merger
data are observed for a long period to evaluate long-run impacts of realized merger.
7 One can recognize the merger investigated in this research as a natural experiment caused by the Asian economic crisis in 1997.
8 The post-merger price simulation method proposed by Nevo (2000, 2001) has two computational challenges: First, the problem of
non-linear minimization search with the nested fixed point algorithms proposed by with Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) [5]. The
details and severity of this problem are discussed thoroughly by Knittel and Metaxoglou (2011 and working paper) [23] [22]. Second, the
large dimensional non-linear simultaneous equation problem associated with post-merger price simulations. I avoid the first challenge
by using the instrumental variable nested-logit model estimation in this research.
9 In this research I avoid using the term “short run” since it generally assumes economic conditions remain unchanged. As explaining
soon, the economic conditions (e.g. household income conditions) changed largely after the Hyudai–Kia merger.
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It turns out that, by incorporating these observed post-merger information, I can account for 61 percent of long-run
price discrepancies. By observing a large fraction of simulation discrepancies which one can account for in the
observed post-merger information, this research suggests that when antitrust policy makers apply the results of
simulations, they must take into account changes in factors which the simulation model takes as exogenous.
1.1 Literature
The recent literature on differentiated-product horizontal mergers evolves with the development of sophisticated
differentiated-product demand estimation methods. Berry (1994) [4] and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995, hence-
forth BLP) [5] propose differentiated product demand estimation methods that can be reliably used for horizontal-
merger analysis. Nevo’s research (2000, 2001) [31] [32] forms the corner-stone, wherein he proposes a simulation
method that emphasizes changes in firm ownership, using the demand-estimation method that BLP proposed a
few years earlier. Nevo’s method provides the structural framework that enables us to derive post-merger prices
using only pre-merger data and information on ownership transitions. Based on this seminal work, several analyses
examining blocked mergers followed10. However, only two papers have applied Nevo’s simulation framework to
a differentiated-product industry merger that actually occurred in the real world. Nevo (2000) [31] investigates
two mergers in the U.S. cereal industry. His study, however, only uses short-term post-merger data and is unable
to investigate the long-run consequences of observed mergers. Peters (2006) [34] investigates five airline mergers
observed in the United States during the 1980s, and he faced significant modeling difficulties11. By comparing simu-
lated and observed short-term post-merger prices12, Peters (2006) reports mixed results in simulation performance.
In summary, the literature provides only two empirical case studies that investigate the short-term performance of
the post-merger price simulation method, and leaving questions of its reliability13. This paper contributes to the
literature by evaluating simulation reliability both in the short term and in the long run after the merger14.
1.2 Settings and Organization of Paper
I apply four important settings throughout this paper. First, all prices used in this research are adjusted for
inflation using Korea’s consumer price index15. Second, I uniformly applied a 1,000 won = 1 U.S. dollar ex-
10For example, Dube (2005) [12] investigates the attempted but blocked mergers between Coca Cola–Dr. Pepper and Pepsi–7Up. Fan
(Working paper) [13] examined a blocked merger in the Minneapolis local newspaper industry. Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) investigate
the attempted but blocked merger between heavy truck manufacturers in Europe, Volvo and Scania. Grzybowski and Pereira (2007)
studied the attempted merger between the Portuguese mobile telephone service providers, TMN Mobile and Optimus Mobile.
11 I recognize the difficulty of applying demand estimation and supply-side modeling to the airline industry. Any consumer demand
model has to include both hub and spoke airport demands. Any supply-side model must include complicated pricing systems such as
mileage points, first versus economy class price differences, and early ticket purchase discounts.
12 Peters (2006) compares simulated prices and prices that were observed one year after airline mergers.
13 Specifically, the literature lacks investigations on this simulation’s long-run performance.
14 Potential weaknesses of this paper should be noted here. I do not have panel-market data, and I am unable to use the multi-marke-
based instrument variables as suggested by Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) [20]. In my post-merger price simulations, I solve 31
to 37 dimensional simultaneous non-linear system equations and computations tend to be unstable. I have plant-level production and
input/output data. However, I do not have brand- (automobile model) level production data, and am unable to recover brand-level
production marginal costs from the data available.
15 I use 2005 as my base year. The consumer price index data come from Statistics Korea (Korea’s national bureau of statistics). For
U.S. car prices, I also used 2005 as my base year.
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Figure 2: Road map of this paper
change rate when representing prices16 for the sake of easily understandable prices. Third, since the announcement
of the Hyunai–Kia merger in November 1998, I define January-1991 through November-1998 as the pre-merger
regime and December-1998 through December-2010 as the post-merger regime17. Lastly, I concentrate my
research on passenger cars, ignoring trucks18 and other commercial vehicles such as buses.
I organize the remainder of this paper as follows: Section 2 describes the automobile industry in Korea; Sections 3
and 4 explore the demand- and supply-side models and provide estimation results; Section 5 evaluates the benchmark
simulation result and reports long-run simulation discrepancies; Section 6 lists potential causes in long-run simulation
discrepancies; Section 7 accounts for long-run price discrepancies by using observed post-merger market data; and
Section 8 concludes the study by suggesting future courses of research.
2 Description of the Automobile Market in Korea
Throughout this paper, I define the Korean automobile market as comprising the entirety of South Korea which
remains geographically separated from other markets1920. this market is distinct in the following four ways: (1)
Korea experienced an economic crisis and sales shares of imported-cars have been extremely small ever since; (2) five
Korean domestic manufactures oligopolize the market; (3) the Hyundai–Kia merger occured in November 1998 and
conglomerated 70 percent of the market, before which there was only one entry, Samsung Motors (February 1998);
and (4) vehicle prices in Korea have been increasing since the Hyundai–Kia merger. In this section, I describe
16 In general, there are many zeros in prices in Korean won, making it difficult to get a sense of numbers. Although the won-dollar
exchange rate is volatile, the long-term average remains close to 1,000 won = 1 U.S. dollar. With this general exchange rate in mind, a
Hyundai Sonata price of 20,829,000 won simply becomes U.S. $20,829.
17 I do not have data from prior to January 1991.
18 Unlike in the United States, pickup trucks are not popular in Korea.
19 South Korea (the Republic of Korea), located on the southern half of the Korean peninsula, is geographically separated from trade
partners by North Korea and surrounding ocean.
20 The dataset used in this paper is a single-market dataset, similar to the dataset used in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pake (1995) [5]. I
do not have smaller market data such as province-level sales data.
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Figure 3: Korea’s automobile market: Domestically produced versus imported car sales
 0
 20000
 40000
 60000
 80000
 100000
 120000
 140000
 160000
 1995  2000  2005  2010
M
on
th
ly 
Sa
le
s
Month/Year
Domestically produced car sales
Imported car sales
Data source: Ward’s Automotive Yearbook (domestically produced cars) and KAIDA (imported cars)
the automobile market in Korea with emphasis on these four points, and make connections to estimations and
simulations discussed in later sections.
2.1 The Asian Economic Crisis and Imported Car Sales
Figure 3 illustrates the monthly sales of domestically produced cars and imported cars (in number of automobiles
sold) in South Korea for 1991–2010. There are two notable findings in Figure 3: First, the market experienced
the Asian economic crisis in 1997–1999, during which time automobile sales slumped. This economic crisis led to
mergers and acquisitions among Korean domestic automobile manufactures, which I will explain in the latter part
of this section. Second, imported car sales shares have remained extremely low, typically less than 2 percent of total
sales2122, and the majority of Korean automobile buyers have purchased domestically-produced cars. Because of
such small shares, I ignore imported car sales in the rest part of this paper.
2.2 Oligopoly with Five Domestic Automobile Manufactures
One can describe the Korean automobile market as highly concentrated in a five-firm oligopoly: Hyundai, Kia,
(GM-)Daewoo, Ssangyong, and (Renault-)Sumsung Motors. The left side of Figure 4 reports monthly sales by firm.
Although monthly sales by firm appear highly volatile23, Hyundai Motors’ sales numbers have been larger than
those of any other firm. The right side of Figure 4 illustrates monthly market share. For the period 1991-2010,
21 Most of the imported cars sold in Korea are German luxury cars such as Audi, BMW, and Mercedes Benz. Note
that the Korean Fair Trade Commission suspects collusive pricing among imported car dealers. See: Korea Times:
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/biz_view.asp?newsIdx=15484&categoryCode=123.
22 Of interest, it is important to determine which factors cause these low imported car sales. The tariff on imported cars decreased
from 30 percent (in 1988) to 8 percent (in 1995), and since has remained constant at 8 percent. I interviewed several Korean native
colleagues and asked the question: “Why do Korean people not buy imported cars?” Their answers were: (1) Imported cars are expensive
in Korea, (2) Korean culture does not allow workers to have cars more luxurious than those of their supervisors (Note: Imported cars in
Korea are mostly luxury cars), (3) Auto insurance companies charge high premiums on imported cars, and (4) Compared to domestic
cars, fewer maintenance dealers are available.
23 Part of the reason that supports this high volatility in sales quantities is labor strikes.
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Figure 4: Left figure: Monthly sales quantities by firm, Right figure: Percentage market shares by firm
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Hyundai Motor’s share has been around 40 to 50 percent; Kia Motors, the second largest automobile manufacture
in Korea, holds 25 to 30. The remaining small firms, (GM-)Daewoo, Ssangyong, and (Renault-)Sumsung Motors,
hold around 10 percent each. As a whole, Hyundai Motors occupies a larger part of Korea’s domestic market share,
and this share grew even larger after the Hyundai–Kia merger.
2.3 The Hyundai-Kia Merger (November 1998) and Samsung Motors Entry (Febru-
ary 1998)
The Korean automobile industry experienced substantial ownership changes between 1991 and 2010. Table 1 depicts
firm ownership transition information. As would be expected, the Hyundai–Kia merger in November 1998 stands
as the most important event during this period. Table 2 lists chronologically the timeline of this merger. One can
consider the Hyundai–Kia merger exogenous, since Kia’s bankruptcy—a result of the Asian economic crisis—led to
the merger24. Ford Motors, a 17 percent shareholder of Kia Motors before the bankruptcy, also expressed interest
in this acquisition, but Ford retreated25. In the simulation section, I simulate a hypothetical scenario of Ford’s
acquisition of Kia Motors. Also, of particular note is that the merged Hyundai–Kia group has continued to use
pre-merger merchandise marks (“Hyundai Motors” and “Kia Motors”), and two networks of retailers (Hyundai
and Kia’dealerships)26. Although the Korean automobile market is highly concentrated, there has been only one
domestic automobile manufacturer entry. Samsung Motors entered the market in February 1998. One may consider
Sumsung’s entry political due to Korea’s presidential policy27 and I treat this entry as exogenous in this research.
24 The merger also had political aspects. In 2007, the president of Hyundai Motors, Chung Mong-Koo, was con-
victed of various bribery activities, potentially including Hyundai’s acquisition of Kia Motors. See: New York Times:
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/06/business/06hyundai.html?ref=chungmongkoo
25 For details about how Ford Motors withdrew from the acquisition, see BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/196667.stm
26 Hyundai group initially owned 51 percent of Kia Motors’ share. Later, the percentage decreased to 35 percent.
27 I will sum up the anecdotal political stories related to Samsung Motors’ entry. They include the following: (1) It was Kun-Hee Lee’s,
the president of Samsung group, long-term desire to own an automobile company; (2) Samsung group and Hyundai group are long time
7
Table 1: Ownership transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firm Trade Name ⇒ Hyundai Kia (GM-)Daewoo Ssangyong (Renault-)Samsung
Year Motors Motors Motors Motors Motors
1991 Hyundai Kia Daewoo Ssangyong ——
1992 Hyundai Kia Daewoo Ssangyong ——
1993 Hyundai Kia Daewoo Ssangyong ——
1994 Hyundai Kia Daewoo Ssangyong (Entry Announcement)
1995 Hyundai Kia Daewoo Ssangyong ——
1996 Hyundai Kia Daewoo Ssangyong ——
1997 (economic crisis) Hyundai Kia Daewoo Ssangyong ——
1998 (economic crisis) Hyundai Kia Daewoo Daewoo Samsung
1999 Hyundai Hyundai Daewoo Daewoo Samsung
2000 Hyundai Hyundai Daewoo Daewoo Samsung
2001 Hyundai Hyundai Daewoo Daewoo Renault-Samsung
2002 Hyundai Hyundai Daewoo Daewoo Renault-Samsung
2003 Hyundai Hyundai GM-Daewoo Ssangyong Renault-Samsung
2004 Hyundai Hyundai GM-Daewoo Ssangyong Renault-Samsung
2005 Hyundai Hyundai GM-Daewoo Ssangyong Renault-Samsung
2006 Hyundai Hyundai GM-Daewoo Ssangyong Renault-Samsung
2007 Hyundai Hyundai GM-Daewoo Ssangyong Renault-Samsung
2008 Hyundai Hyundai GM-Daewoo Ssangyong Renault-Samsung
2009 Hyundai Hyundai GM-Daewoo Ssangyong Renault-Samsung
2010 Hyundai Hyundai GM-Daewoo Ssangyong Renault-Samsung
Note: Cells describe owner firms. For example, in year 2002, Kia Motors was owned by Hyundai Motors.
Data source: Official firm websites and various news paper articles from The JoongAng Ilbo, The Dong-A Ilbo, and The Chosun Ilbo
Table 2: Korean economic crisis, merger, and acquisition timeline
Date Event
Late 1996 ∼ Jun. 1997 Default problems gradually grew in the Korean economy
1997 Jul. Asian economic crisis, triggered by the collapse of Thai baht
1997 Jul. Kia Motors announced bankruptcy, triggered Korean economic crisis
Kia Motors came under creditor bank and court control
1998 Nov. Creditor banks announced Hyundai Motors’ acquisition of Kia Motors
(Ford Motors,17% shareholder of Kia Motors before the bankruptcy, was also interested in acquisition)
1999 Jun. Samsung Motors announced bankruptcy, and came under creditor bank and court control
2000 Apr. Renault group acquired Samsung Motors
2001 ∼ 2002 General Motors (GM) gradually proceeded with the acquisition of Daewoo Motors
(The new firm, GM-Daewoo Motors, was formally established in Nov. 2002)
Data source: Various newspaper articles from The JoongAng Ilbo, The Dong-A Ilbo, and The Chosun Ilbo
2.4 Post-Merger Vehicle Price Increases
After the Hyundai–Kia merger in November 1998, the market saw significant hikes in vehicle prices. The left side
of Figure 9 indicates aggregated (market level) sales-weighted vehicle transaction prices in Korea28. The aggregate
prices increased after the Hyundai-Kia merger. During the pre-merger regime (1991–1998) the average price was
only $13,998; in the post-merger regime (1999–2010) the average price was $19,035, an increase of 35.98 percent (=
19,035
13,998 × 100 − 100). The right side of Figure 9 illustrates sales-weighted vehicle transaction prices by firm. These
rivals; (3) Kim Young-Sam (the seventh president of Korea) competed with Jeong Juyeong (the founder of Hyundai group and the owner
of Hyundai Motors) in the 1992 Korean presidential election. Kim Young-Sam won the race; (4) After the 1992 presidential election,
Kim Young-Sam’s administration prosecuted Jeong Juyeong for violations of election law, and Kim Young-Sam’s administration and
the Hyundai group continued to experience political tensions; (5) Kim Young-Sam had been elected from the Busan area, the second-
largest metropolitan area in Korea; (6) Samsung announced its entry into the automobile market in 1994 along with a plan to build
an automobile plant in Busan, one and a half years after Kim Young-Sam had been elected president. (7) Samsung Motors began to
produce passenger vehicles in the newly constructed Busan plant in February 1998. In the same month, Kim Young-Sam completed his
presidential term.
28 Appendix explains the construction of these aggregate prices. I also calculated the index-weighted aggregate prices.
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Figure 5: Left figure: Sales-weighted aggregate price, Right figure: Sales-weighted prices by firm
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Figure 6: Left figure: Compact car prices, Right figure: Mid-size car prices
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prices show that consumers saw more expensive Hyundai–Kia group cars after the merger. Figure 6 depicts vehicle
pricing among compact (left side of Figure 6) and mids-size (right side of Figure 6) class cars29. This offers three
notable findings. First, vehicle prices had been decreasing before the 1998 Hyundai–Kia merger. Second, although
the merger was announced in November 1998, the post-merger price increases did not occur until 2003. During
1999–2003, the merged Hyundai-Kia group refrained from making unilateral price increases30. Third, after year
29 See Appendix for pricing history of other classes of vehicles.
30 Several reasons explain these non-immediate post-merger price increases: (1) Hyundai–Kia group improved its plant-level produc-
tivities, and marginal costs decreased. Appendix contains results from plant-level production function estimations, and I find statistically
significant post-merger productivity increases among Hyundai–Kia group plants. (2) The merged firm most likely was concerned about
public backlash (mass media and consumer reactions) against any immediate post-merger price increases; (3) The newly merged firm
9
Figure 7: Left figure: Hyundai Sonata prices in the United States versus in Korea, Right figure: Hyundai
Avante/Elantra prices in the United States versus in Korea
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Basement prices and ratios are:
Hyundai Sonata price in the United States in 1992 = 1, Hyundai Sonata price in Korea in December 1992 = 1
Hyundai Elantra price in the United States in 1992 = 1, Hyundai Avante/Elantra price in Korea in December 1992 = 1
Note: (1) The Korean won was relatively strong (appreciated) in 1992 (due to the post-Seoul-Olympics boom); (2) I choose 1992 as the
base year of comparison as the U.S. prices before 1992 are not available; (3) In Korea, the Hyundai Elantra has been sold under the
name Avante since February 1995.
2003, the merged Hyundai-Kia group seems to have adopted unilateral pricing strategies. As a whole, one can
clearly observe long-run price increases in Figure 6.
Some may question whether vehicle price increases in Korea were caused by product quality improvements. To
investigate this possibility, I compare Hyundai-Sonata and Hyundai-Avante31 pricing histories in the United States
and in Korea. Figure 7 indicates that prices in Korea largely increased after the merger, while prices in the United
States increased only moderately. Assuming that market competition conditions in the United States remained
unchanged, a quality increase alone could not explain the drastic price increases observed in Korea32.
2.5 Data Source
I collected data from various sources. First, I compiled monthly passenger vehicle price data from two monthly
automobile magazines widely circulated in South Korea, Carlife Magazine andMotor Magazine. These two monthly
needed time to make management-level integrations.
31Hyundai Avante is sold under the name of Elantra in the United States.
32 Automobile buyers generally perceive that Korean automakers have increased their product quality in recent years. In the United
States, Hyudnai-Sonata and Hyundai-Elantra prices have increased about 10 percent, and I attribute these price increases to the quality
improvement. Note that the prices of Hyudnai-Sonata and Hyundai-Elantra have increased 26 percent and 38 percent in Korea.
10
magazines maintain lists of new car prices from the late 1980s33. Second, Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 1992–2011 34
sources the monthly brand-level sales quantities. Since Ward’s Automotive Yearbook does not contain brand-level
sales quantity data before 1994, I collected the 1991–1994 brand-level monthly sales data from the Monthly Korean
Automotive Industry Journal published by the Korean Automobile Manufacturers Association (KAMA). Third, I
use the two car magazines described above along with the annual report, Korean Automobile Industry: Annual
Version, released by KAMA, to gather the car specification data. Fourth, I obtained plant-level35 production
output and input data from the Annual Mining and Manufacturing Survey conducted by the Statistics Korea36.
Fifth, I compiled ownership (merger) transition processes and timing information from three Korean newspapers;
The JoongAng Ilbo37, The Dong-A Ilbo38, The Chosun Ilbo39, and official company websites. Sixth, price index,
demographic (such as numbers of households used as market sizes), worker wage, and bank loan rate data come
from the Bank of Korea (BOK) and the Statistics Korea.
3 Demand Side Model and Estimations
This section describes the demand side model and estimation results. I use these estimates to compute substitution
patterns in post-merger price simulations in later sections of this paper.
3.1 Demand Model
The demand model builds upon Berry’s (1994) instrumental variable (henceforth IV) nested-logit model. For
notational simplicity, I denote t ∈ {1, · · · , T } to index months, i ∈ {1, · · · , It} to index households at time t,
j ∈ {1, · · · , Jt} to represent supplied automobile brand index at time t, q ∈ {1, · · · , Q} to be quarter dummy, and
g ∈ {1, · · · , G} to be automobile type group index40. In particular, gj indicates the automobile type group to which
brand j belongs. The (after taking log) Cobb-Douglas utility function is expressed as
uijt =
Q∑
q=2
θqdqt + αpjt + xjtβ + ξjt + ζigj + (1− σ)εijt (1)
where dqt is quarter dummy, pjt is brand j’s price at time t, xjt is brand j’s observable characteristics vector, ξjt is
an unobserved (by researchers) product characteristic. Quarter dummies are included to proxy incomes. Consumer
33 To collect vehicle prices, the editors of these two magazines call local dealers and gather dealership-level prices. Prices of a specific
automobile brand in a specific month listed in these magazines prove close but not identical. Typically, price differences come within
$500 of each other. I believe such non-identical prices are a good signal of accuracy, since they seem to reflect dealership-level price
heterogeneities.
34 Berry, Levinsohn, and Pake (1995) [5] also extracted price and sales quantity data for the U.S. automobile industry from these
yearbooks.
35 I could not obtain vehicle brand-level production data. Since a single automobile plant produces multiple vehicle brands, this dataset
does not allow me to recover the brand-level production marginal costs. However, I was able to evaluate productivity improvement
(merger synergy) after the Hyundai-Kia merger through the production function estimation analysis. See Appendix for details.
36 http://kostat.go.kr/portal/english/surveyOutlines/6/2/index.static
37 http://joongangdaily.joins.com/
38 http://english.donga.com/
39 http://english.chosun.com/
40 In the estimation, I categorize automobile brands in to four groups (1) the Small- and Compact-size group, (2) the Mid-size
group, (3) the Mid- and Full-size luxury group, and (4) the Jeep, SUV, and Minivan group, according to their price differences and
functionalities.
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Table 3: Automobile nesting groups for instrumental variable nested-logit estimation
Nesting group Price range Size/Functionalities Examples:
(i) Small- & Compact-size group $4,000–$15,000 Small interior, Fuel-efficient, Daewoo-Matiz, Hyundai-Accent
Commuter vehicle Hyundai-Avante, Samsung-SM3
(ii) Mid-size group $16,000–$29,000 Medium interior Hyundai-Sonata, Kia-Optima
Commuter vehicle Kia-Credos, Samsung-SM5
(iii) Mid- & Full-size luxury group $30,000–$76,000 Luxury-oriented Hyundai-Grandeur, Hyundai-Equus
Commuter vehicle Kia-Enterprise, Ssangyong-Chairman
(iv) Jeep, SUV & Minivan group $18,000–$36,000 Large interior, Sports-oriented Hyundai-SantaFe, Kia-Carnival
Family, Commercial use Hyundai-Tucson, Daewoo-Rezzo
See Table 11 in Appendix for details of these group categorizations.
taste parameters ({(θ2, · · · θQ), α, β, σ)} are to be estimated. Note that ζigj captures individual i’s taste over group
gj , and (1 − σ)εijt captures individual i’s idiosyncratic taste for product j. Specifically, the parameter σ ∈ [0, 1]
captures the degree of inside group substitutions. If σ is close to one, consumer i becomes more likely to substitute
to products within the same automobile type group. On the other hand, if σ is close to zero, consumer i substitutes
across all type groups. Following Berry (1994) [4], I make distributional assumptions. Both εijt and ζigj +(1−σ)εijt
follow an i.i.d. type I extreme value distribution. By integrating, I obtain the analytic market shares as follows
sjt =
exp
(
δjt
1−σ
)
∑
k∈gj
exp
(
δkt
1−σ
) ·
[∑
k∈gj
exp
(
δkt
1−σ
)]1−σ
∑
g=1,··· ,G
[∑
l∈g exp
(
δlt
1−σ
)]1−σ , (2)
where I denote a mean utility41
δjt =
Q∑
q=2
θqdqt + αpjt + xjtβ + ξjt.
Berry (1994) [4] inverted the above market share and obtained
ln
(
sjt
s0t
)
=
Q∑
q=2
θqdqt + αpjt + xjtβ + σ ln
(
sjt
sgjt
)
+ ξjt (3)
where s0t is an outside goods (not purchasing cars) share
42 and sgjt is the market share of group gj at time t.
3.2 Automobile Brand Nesting Group Categorizations
Table 3 describes the automobile brand group categorization used in this research: (i) Small- and Compact-size,
(ii) Mid-size, (iii) Mid- and Full-size luxury, and (iv) Jeep, Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV), and Minivan. I categorize
these four groups based on price differences and functionalities. The Small- and Compact-size group cars are priced
substantially lower than cars in other groups, and the restrictions on consumer budgets keep substitutions to other
groups implausible. The cars in the Mid- and Full-size luxury group are priced higher than cars in the other groups.
The Mid-size group and the Jeep, SUV, and Minivan group are divided based on their functionalities. Buyers of
41The outside option (not purchasing a car) at time t is δ0t =
∑Q
q=2 θqdqt in this model. I normalize quarter 0 outside option mean
utility to be δ00 = 0.
42 I define the market size as the number of households in Korea, extracted from the Korean National Census in 1990, 1995, 2000,
2005, and 2010.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics: Variables in the pre-merger regime (left table), Variables in the post-merger regime
(right table)
Pre-merger regime 1991–1998 data (sample size = 2330)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
sjt 0.0002657 0.0003224 0.0000000735 0.0020515
s0t 0.9934809 0.0018015 0.989058 0.9976192
sjt
sgjt
0.1634075 0.1665415 0.0000166 0.9018136
Price 18804.89 12458.19 4044.367 67551.83
Size 11.2441 1.900422 6.52302 16.03113
HP/kg 0.0896633 0.0235246 0.0451411 0.1414791
Km/l 14.07257 3.71396 8 24.1
Post-merger regime 1999–2007 data (sample size = 3729)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
sjt 0.0001484 0.0001544 0.0000000629 0.0009395
s0t 0.9944497 0.0009979 0.9916624 0.9963381
sjt
sgjt
0.1075127 0.1255659 0.0000218 0.7337996
Price 19574.06 11310.8 3877.454 76919.34
Size 12.47808 2.280907 6.52302 18.12583
HP/Kg 0.0909397 0.0188715 0.0514045 0.1599073
Km/l 12.34554 3.397297 7 24.1
the Jeep, SUV, and Minivan group’s cars are expected to evaluate large spaces or sports-oriented functionalities,
while Mid-size group car buyers do not. Based on these four groups, inside group shares are calculated and used in
demand estimations.
3.3 Price Elasticities
The advantage of the instrumental variable nested-logit is its simplicity in computing price elasticities. From
equation (2), one can derive own and cross price elasticities,

∂sjt
∂pjt
pjt
sjt
= α1−σ
[
1− σ
(
sjt
sgjt
)
− (1− σ)sjt
]
pjt (Own price elasticity)
∂skt
∂pjt
pjt
skt
= α1−σ
[
−σ
(
sjt
sgj t
)
− (1 − σ)sjt
]
pjt if k ∈ gj (Within group cross price elasticity)
∂slt
∂pjt
pjt
slt
= −αsjtpjt if l /∈ gj (Outside group cross price elasticity).
(4)
and one can calculate these elasticities based on estimated (α, σ) and observed market shares43.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 lists descriptive statistics. By comparing pre- and post-merger variables, several notable differences appear.
First, the mean of the inflation adjusted vehicle price is higher in the post-merger regime, as a natural consequence
of market conglomeration after the Hyundai–Kia merger. Second, the mean size had increased (and mean of Km/l
has decreased), since a greater variety of large size cars, SUVs, and minivans became available in 2000s. Third, as
numbers of supplied vehicle brands had increases after the Hyundai–Kia merger, the mean of shares (and the mean
of in-group share) decreased.
43 Price derivatives are

∂sjt
∂pjt
= α
1−σ
[
1− σ
(
sjt
sgjt
)
− (1 − σ)sjt
]
sjt (Own price derivative)
∂skt
∂pjt
= α
1−σ
[
−σ
(
sjt
sgjt
)
− (1− σ)sjt
]
skt if k ∈ gj (Within group cross price derivative)
∂slt
∂pjt
= −αsjtslt if l /∈ gj (Outside group cross price derivative).
(5)
These derivatives are used for simulations.
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3.5 Choice of Instrumental Variables
The major difficulty in estimating equation (3) is the endogeneity in ξjt. An individual i prefers automobile brands
that have large observed characteristics, and firms optimally respond by pricing such brands higher. Therefore, an
observed price pjt is positively correlated with an unobserved product characteristic ξjt, creating positive bias in price
coefficient estimations. To solve this endogeneity problem, the literature suggests several specific types of instru-
mental variables; herein follows the conventional usages of instruments. From, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) [5], I use
Instrument Variables:
(1) Cost shifter = (Kilogram of vehicle) × (Importer Price Index)
(2) Within the same class sum of competing firm product size
(3) Within the same class sum of competing firm product horsepower per kilogram
(4) Within the same class sum of competing firm product kilometer per liter
in this research. Since Korea is a natural-resource importing county, and since material costs in the produc-
tion of one vehicle remain roughly proportional to that vehicle’s weight, (1) measures variable material costs in
productions44. As material costs are positively correlated with price, but unlikely to be correlated with unobserved
product characteristics, the above cost shifter becomes a valid instrument. Furthermore, (2)-(4) measure the degree
of market competition. The more products other firms offer, the more severe the competition. To measure precisely
the degree of competition, I classified the vehicles into nine classes (automobile types), and take summations of
each observed product characteristic within each class (see Table 11 in Appendix for details of classifications). Since
competition becomes more severe with a larger number of competing products, instruments (2)-(4) are negatively
correlated with observed prices. However, instruments (2)-(4) are unlikely to be correlated with unobserved product
characteristics ξjt
45.
3.6 Demand Estimation Results and Estimated Elasticities
Table 5 reports estimation results and calculated own elasticities based on equation (4). In addition to the instru-
mental variable nested-logit demand model, I also estimate OLS logit and instrumental variable logit demand models
for comparisons. I separate the dataset into pre-merger regime data (years 1991–1998) and post-merger regime data
(years 1999–2007), since I use only pre-merger regime data for the basement simulation. Price coefficients derived
44 Because the Korean won historically has highly volatile exchange rates, Korea’s Importer Price Index is also volatile. See Figure
10.
45 I recognize there is a subtle endogenous product line choice concern in this statement. There are at least four possible scenarios of
endogeneity:
(A) If ξjt is large, i.e., product j is attractive
⇒(A-1) competing firms introduce copy-cat products into a market
⇒(A-2) competing firms consider competition with product j difficult, and do not introduce rivaling products
(B) If ξjt is small (or very negative), i.e. product j is unattractive
⇒(B-1) competing firms consider a profit opportunity, and introduce rivaling products that beat out product j
⇒(B-2) competing firms do not consider producing similar cars profitable, and do not introduce rival products
These four scenarios provide opposite consequences in terms of endogenous product line choices. I believe all of these scenarios are
possible and, in general, ξjt does not correlate to (2)-(4). Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) [5] use similar instruments.
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Table 5: Estimation results
Pre-merger Pre-merger Pre-merger Post-merger Post-merger Post-merger
Variable OLS logit IV logit IV nested-logit OLS logit IV logit IV nested-logit
α : -0.000068** -0.000117** -0.0000820** -0.0000642** -0.0001094** -0.0000582**
Price in thousand won (0.000004) (0.0000116) (0.0000040) (0.0000257) (0.0000188) (0.0000056)
σ : 0.6677716** 0.5403498**
In-group substitution (0.0793395) (0.0733306)
β1 : 0.0321820 0.2328088** 0.0254591 0.2352142** 0.4481224** 0.2457095**
Size in meter3 (0.0347774) (0.053974) (0.0193732) (0.0148575) (0.0417942) (0.0206055)
β2 : 2.24454 14.26855** 14.92290** 8.752057** 31.59749** 10.07008**
Horsepower per kilogram (2.662645) (3.537377) (1.967729) (1.653547) (4.449519) (2.169522)
β3 : -0.0386531** -0.0501671** -0.0366461** 0.1540414** 0.0420579* 0.0433083
Kilometer per liter (0.0152014) (0.0149092) (0.0069798) (0.0098804) (0.0233517) (0.010283)
β0 : -7.713562** -9.899668** -7.07191** -15.5793** -16.17454** -11.45489**
Constant (.7279814) (0.8051303) (0.327289) (0.3871796) (0.4878732) (0.66416)
Measure of fit: R-square 0.22971 - 0.222 0.1016 - 0.629
or Sargan Test (5% value) (3.84) (3.84)
First-stage R-square - - 0.8190 - - 0.7379
Sample size 2330 2330 2330 3978 3978 3975
# of inelastic demand (%) 1072 (46.0%) 392 (16.8%) 12 (0.5%) 1576 (39.6%) 695 (17.5%) 478 (12.0%)
Mean own elasticity -1.291635 -2.199729 -4.127113 -1.256478 -2.070645 -2.322189
Median own elasticity -1.074259 -1.829523 -3.136359 -1.162262 -1.915378 -2.118278
Min own elasticity -4.640796 -7.903539 -16.60229 -4.93795 -8.137618 -9.630547
Max own elasticity -0.2778367 -0.4731717 -0.853698 -0.2489306 -0.4102315 -0.488998
Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors.
** indicates t-statistics are significant within 5 percent.
IV used: IV logit model - Cost-shifter for both pre- and post-merger data (thus, just-identified model).
IV used: IV Nested logit model - (1), (2), and (4) for pre-merger data; (1), (2), and (3) for post-merger data.
Note that in the instrumental variable nested-logit estimations, I removed IV (3) for pre-merger data and IV (4) for
post-merger data to avoid over-identifications detected by Sargan statistics.
from each estimation method agree with general findings reported in the automobile literature46. Price coefficients
from OLS logit estimation suffer from the endogeneity problems, and are positively biased. Instrumental variable
logit estimations alleviate endogeneity bias, although estimated elasticities tend to be inelastic47. Pre-merger in-
46 See Table III in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) [5], and Table 4 in Petrin (2002) [35].
47 Such inelasticities come from own price elasticity equation in the logit demand model. The logit demand model provides elasticity
equations 

∂sjt
∂pjt
pjt
sjt
= α(1 − sjt)pjt (Own price elasticity)
∂skt
∂pjt
pjt
skt
= −αsjtpjt (Cross price elasticity).
In this research, I define market size as all households in Korea, and only tiny portions of the households buy automobiles in any given
month. Thus, sjt is close to zero. Then, own price elasticities are almost perfectly proportional to prices. As a result, low-price cars
tend to have inelastic demands. This result contradicts our empirical observation that buyers of low price cars are elastic and price
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Figure 8: Left figure: Pre-merger regime (1991-1998) own-price elasticities, Right figure: Post-merger regime (1999-
2007) own-price elasticities.
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strumental variable nested-logit estimation provides reasonable elasticities, and I observe that only 0.5 percent of
demands are inelastic4849. I use these pre-merger IV nested-logit estimates in simulations.
This analysis reveals drastic differences between the estimated pre-merger and post-merger regimes’ preferences.
To understand such drastic preference changes, I briefly note the history of the Korean economy and its motor-
ization. After the 1988 Seoul Olympics, Korea’s economy entered a high growth period, and many households
obtained their initial opportunity to purchase a vehicle. For their initial car choices, Korean households were mainly
concerned about prices and, therefore, this concern compromised other vehicle characteristics. Under such economic
circumstances, Korean households mainly bought small50 and fuel-inefficient but cheap cars in the pre-merger regime
(1991–1998). Note that the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) officially endorsed
South Korea as a developed country in 1996, although the recession of 1997–1998 set back economic growth51.
My pre-merger regime estimation results agree closely with this historical observation. Consumers were relatively
elastic and preferred non-large-size and fuel-inefficient (but cheap) vehicles in the pre-merger regime (1991–1998).
The household environment dramatically changed after the recession. As the economy escaped from the recession
and the recovery boom arrived in 2000–2002. Rebounding from recession, banks largely relaxed their credit-inquiry
sensitive. Thus, the logit-demand model remains inappropriate in this research. Note that the nested logit demand model improves this
defect by accounting for in-group shares in elasticity calculations.
48 In Table V of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) [5], they report year 1990 US automobile buyers’ elasticities; these are close to
my pre-merger elasticities derived from the instrumental variable nested-logit estimation.
49 Moreover, in Copeland, Dunn, and Hall (2011) [10] Table 5, they report own price elasticities among US automobile buyers during
1999–2004. The their elasticities are [-3.6, -1.5], which is less elastic than the mean elasticity of my pre-merger IV nested-logit model. I
recognize that income level difference between United States and Korea causes this discripancy in elasticities. Income in Korea (during
1991–1998) was expected to be lower than that of the United States (during 1999–2004). Note that my post-merger IV nested-logit
estimates provide elasticities closer to Copeland, Dunn, and Hall’s results.
50 Note that the coefficient of size is not statistically significant in the instrumental variable nested-logit estimation with pre-merger
data.
51 During the Korean recession (1997–1998), the majority of vehicles bought in Korea were small- and compact-size cars.
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requirements52, and households obtained generous loan opportunities, including auto loans. They also began to
replace their initial cars, and households typically chose more expensive cars than the cars they had initially pur-
chased. After 2002, the Korean economy has continued to grow without serious economic stagnation (the average
worker wage increased 30 percent compared to that of pre-merger regime, see Table 7), and more and more expensive
cars became affordable to Korean households. Post-merger regime estimation results agree with these observations.
Korean automobile buyers became relatively inelastic with higher wages and more access to auto loans. In addition,
they preferred larger size cars, and they also evaluated fuel-efficiency in the post-merger regime. These estimated
preferences reflect the introduction of a number of SUVs into the Korean domestic market and the continued rise
of gasoline prices during the 2000s.
Figure 8 plots the relations between calculated elasticities and vehicle sizes (in square meter) in both pre- and
post-merger regimes. I observe that luxury and sports cars have large (in absolute value) elasticities. This occurs
because elasticities in nested-logit demand are roughly linear in price53, and luxury and sports cars have higher
prices. I recognize elasticities among those cars are likely to be inflated, although these cars have relatively tiny
market shares, and inflated elasticities have limited effects in this research54.
4 Supply Side Model
In this section, I describe the supply side model used to recover marginal costs and post-merger price simulations.
Here, I strictly follow the simulation framework proposed by Nevo (2000) [31] and Nevo (2001) [32].
4.1 Firms’ Optimization Problem
I assume firms engage in static Bertrand competitions. The Bertrand price competition model is especially suitable
for describing the Korean automobile market for the following three reasons. First, Korean automobile dealers
explicitly post price tags on cars in their dealerships. Second, brochures available in dealerships explicitly list prices.
Third, widely circulated automobile magazines, containing lists of automobile prices, have been available since the
late 1980s, and automobile buyers have been well-informed about automobile prices. Other forms of competition,
such as competition through choosing sales quantities, are highly unlikely to reflect these three observed facts. As
some may argue over my choice of the static competition model, I will return to this point in a later portion of this
paper. Firms that choose automobile band prices maximize profits as follows:
Πft =
∑
j∈Fft
(pjt −mcjt) · sjt(pt) ·Mt − Cft
where f ∈ [1, · · · , F ] represents a firm, Fft is a set of products which firm f supplies to the market at time t, mcjt
is the marginal cost of product j, pt is a price vector and its dimension is equal to the number of total products
available at time t, Mt is the number of households in Korea, and Cft is fixed cost. The first-order necessary
condition can be derived as
pt −mct = {Ωt × St(pt)}
−1
st(pt) (6)
52 A credit-card boom was observed during 2000–2003 in Korea.
53 Note that Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) [5], who use the logit demand model as their basis, also have this linear-in-price
problem.
54 In simulations, I fixed full-size luxury and sports car shares to alleviate computational difficulties.
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Table 6: Recovered markups and marginal costs in pre-merger regime (January 1991–November 1998)
Manufacturer Band Class Category Average of Average of Average of Markup Post-merger brand
pre-merger pre-merger pre-merger Percentage termination status
observed markups: marginal costs: (Termination during
prices: pjt pjt −mcjt mcjt Dec 1998 - Nov 2003)
Hyundai Atoz City/Small $ 6,316 $ 523 $ 5,796 8.28% Terminated (in Dec 2002)
Kia Pride City/Small $ 6,965 $ 782 $ 6,182 11.22% Terminated (in Feb 2000)
Hyundai Accent Sub-compact $ 8,194 $ 991 $ 7,203 12.09% Terminated (in Oct 1999)
Kia Avella Sub-compact $ 7,929 $ 667 $ 7,262 8.41% Terminated (in Feb 2000)
Hyundai Avente Compact $11,517 $2,037 $ 9,480 17.69% Not terminated
Kia Sephia Compact $10,709 $1,023 $ 9,686 9.55% Terminated (in Jul 2000)
Kia Shuma Compact $ 9,821 $ 853 $ 8,967 8.40% Terminated (in Jan 2001)
Hyundai Sonata Mid-size $17,593 $3,311 $14,282 18.82% Not terminated
Kia Credos Mid-size $16,471 $1,529 $14,941 9.28% Terminated (in Aug 2000)
Kia Retona Compact Jeep $12,041 $ 874 $11,167 7.26% Terminated (in Dec 2000)
Hyundai Gallopper Jeep $21,721 $2,302 $19,419 10.60% Not terminated
Kia Sportage Compact crossover SUV $17,746 $1,790 $15,956 10.09% Terminated (in Dec 2002)
Hyundai Santamo Minivan $19,395 $1,624 $17,771 8.37% Terminated (in Dec 2002)
Kia Carnival Minivan $19,884 $2,336 $17,547 11.75% Not terminated
Hyundai and Kia Motors brands supplied in Nov 1998 (merger announcement month).
1000 won = 1 United States dollar exchange rate applied for prices listed on this table
Note: Kia Sportage was brought back in Aug. 2004
where Ωt and St(pt) are a square product ownership and substitution matrices with (m,n) entries are (m: row index
and n: column index)
Ωt,mn =
{
1 if product m and n are supplied by the same firm
0 otherwise
St,mn = −
∂snt
∂pmt
and × is the entry-by-entry multiplication. All of the right-hand side variables in equation (6) are observed or
estimated; Ωt is observed in data, St can be calculated from equation (5) with estimated parameters, and st
is observed market share. Therefore, one can calculate markups from observed data and estimated parameters.
Furthermore, by subtracting markups from observed prices, we can also calculate marginal costs. Table 6 contains
calculated markups and marginal costs for brands that were supplied in November 1998 (merger announcement
month). Since the calculated markups and marginal costs fluctuate month to month, I take the averages over months
in the pre-merger regime. Recovered markups roughly agree with those reported in BLP (1995) and calculated
marginal costs are used for post-merger price simulations.
5 Post-Merger Price Benchmark Simulation
In this section, I describe the post-merger price simulation framework, benchmark simulation assumptions, and
benchmark simulation results. I use the simulation framework explained in this section throughout the rest of this
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paper, although I will change simulation assumptions.
5.1 Simulation Framework
The post-merger price simulation follows the framework suggested by Nevo (2000, 2001) [31] [32]. The simulation
process comprises the inverse operation of calculating markups and marginal costs. Rewriting the firms’ profit
maximizing first-order condition equation (6) with slight notational modifications,[
Ωpost-merger × S(p)
]
(p− mˆc)− s(p) = 0 (7)
where mˆc is the vector of estimated pre-merger marginal cost (averaged out over the pre-merger period) and
Ωpost-merger is the post-merger ownership matrix. A vector of prices p = [p1, p2, · · · , pJ ] solves this system of
non-linear equations.
5.2 Benchmark (Conventional) Simulation Assumptions
Here, I list the assumptions for a post-merger price simulation, which are conventionally assumed in the differentiated-
product industry horizontal-merger literature. These assumptions are de-facto standard assumptions in such post-
merger price simulation analyses as Nevo (2000) 55, [31] Dube (2005) [12], and Peters (2006) [34].
Benchmark (Conventional) Assumptions:
(I-1) Consumer income conditions will remain the same after a merger
(II-1) Consumer preferences (including unobserved product characteristics) will remain the same after a merger
(III-1) Marginal costs will remain the same after a merger
(IV-1) Product line will remain the same after a merger
In the benchmark simulation computation, I materialize the above (I-1)-(IV-4) by using,
Benchmark (Conventional) Assumptions: Implementations
(I-2) Applying the average of pre-merger quarter dummies (which are income proxies), θˆqt
(II-2) Applying pre-merger consumer preference (αˆ, βˆ, σˆ) and average of pre-merger unobserved characteristics ξˆjt
(III-2) Applying the average of pre-merger marginal costs ˆmcjt
(IV-2) Using the pre-merger product line (product line supplied in Nov. 1998, the merger announcement month)
One should recognize these assumptions as averaged pre-merger information. By using them, I am explicitly as-
suming that market conditions of (I-2)-(IV-2) will not change after the merger. In the next section, I re-compute
observed changes in each of (I-2)-(IV-2) with other factors fixed (Ceteris Paribus approach).
55 Note that Nevo (2000) [31], the inventor of this simulation method, clearly expressed his concerns about these simulation as-
sumptions, “However, this approach is not consistent with firms changing their strategies in other dimensions [than price dimension]
that may influence demand. For example, if as a result of the merger the level of advertising changes, and advertising influences price
sensitivity, then the estimate of the post-merger equilibrium price based on [simulation equation] will be wrong. In addition. this implies
that characteristics, observed and unobserved, and the value of the outside good are assumed to stay the same pre- and post-merger.
Therefore, I am implicitly assuming that the price of the outside good is exogenous and does not change in response to the merger.”
See (p.403) of his paper.
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Figure 9: Left figure: Merger simulations versus observed prices, Right figure: Merger simulation versus average of
observed prices (Short term 1999–2003, and Long run 2004–2010)
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5.3 Benchmark Simulation Results
The simulated post-merger aggregate price is obtained as follows. I first obtain simulated prices for all vehicle
brands by solving the non-linear simultaneous equation (7). Then, using the equation (2), I calculate market shares
for each vehicle brand, and sales weighted aggregate market prices are calculated. Figure 9 reports the simulation
results with benchmark assumptions. I find that the simulation with conventional assumptions can well-predict
post-merger short-term (1999–2003) prices56. The averaged observed short-term (1999–2003) sales weighted price
is $17,109, and the simulation predicts $16,741. The short-term price difference gap is $368 (= $17,109 - $16,741),
and the simulation only under-predicts by 2.15 percent (= 17,109−16,74117,109 · 100). However, the simulation, in large
part, under-predicts long-run prices. The averaged observed long-run (2004–2010) sales weighted price is $20,433,
while the simulation predicts only $16,741. The long-run price difference gap is $3,692( = $20,433 - $16,741), and
the simulation under-predicts by 18.07 percent (= 20,433−16,74120,433 · 100). There are several potential reasons for this
long-run price discrepancy, and I will investigate them in the next section57.
56 This result should be interpreted with the following strong cautions. First, even in the short-term, market conditions changed
significantly. Consumer incomes conditions (including automobile loan opportunities), supply side marginal costs, and product lines
changed greatly as I will explain in the next section. Second, the merged Hyundai–Kia group seemed to refrain from making unilateral
price increases until the end of 2002. Thus, the benchmark simulation assumptions (I-2)-(IV-2) did not hold even in the short term, and
the simulated price is close to the observed price almost by coincidence.
57 Another notable finding is that it took two and-a-half years from the time the merger was announced for market participants to
reach predicted post-merger prices. In theoretical merger models, if a merger happened yesterday, a merged firm increases its product
prices today (and rival firms also increase prices today). In reality, the effect of a merger does not appear immediately because of many
real-world conditions such as (1) a merged firm needs time to be organizationally reconciled, (2) menu costs, or (3) fear of consumers
and media backlash in the wake of price increases.
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Table 7: Average monthly wage Korea (1991-2010)
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Inflation adjustd average per worker monthly wage in Korea
Period Average monthly wage Change
Pre-merger $1,891 —
(1991-1998)
Post-merger short term $2,024 +7.1%
(1999-2003)
Post-merger long run $2,475 +30.9%
(2004-2010)
6 Potential Causes in Long-Run Simulation Discrepancies
There are several possible reasons for long-run price discrepancies. In this section, I list potential causes using
observed post-merger data. These causes become the basis for the simulated price discrepancy analysis discussed in
the next section.
I: Post-Merger Changes in Consumer Income
The first factor to review is the change in consumer (household) income. Table 7 lists the average monthly wage
in Korea for 1991–2010. I observe that wages steadily increased in the post-merger regime (1999–2010). Compared
to the pre-merger regime average wage, workers in Korea are 7.1 percent wealthier in the short term (1999–2003),
and 30.9 percent wealthier in the long–run (2004–2010). In the demand side of the model, one can expect that
the quarter dummies (income proxies) of consumers’ utility function in equation (1) increase with these increases
in wages. Given this increase in wages, and given other factors remain unchanged, it is optimal for firms to charge
prices higher than pre-merger regime prices. Therefore, changes in wages (incomes) are part of the explanation for
price increases.
II: Post-Merger Changes in Consumer Preferences
Changes in consumer preferences constitute the second and largest factor. Table 5 indicates that automobile buyers
in Korea had become price inelastic in the post-merger regime. The mean elasticity with instrumental variable
nested-logit model in pre-merger regime is −4.13, while it is −2.32 in the post-merger regime. Given that other
factors remain unchanged, firms can charge higher vehicle prices without losing much demand with this estimated
post-merger preference. Thus, one can expect that the non-trivial portions of price increases can be explained by
preference changes.
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Table 8: Pre- and Post-merger marginal cost comparison
Manufacturer-Brand Class Pre-merger Pre-merger Pre-merger Pre-merger Post-merger Post-merge Post-merger Post-merger
average average average mc/price average price average average mc/price
price markup mc ratio price markup mc ratio
Hyundai-Avante Sub-compact $11,517 $2,037 $ 9,489 0.82 $12,806 $2,614 $10,192 0.80
Hyundai-Sonata Mid-size $17,593 $3,311 $14,282 0.81 $19,746 $4,453 $15,293 0.77
Hyundai-Grandeur Mids-size luxury $37,205 $4,898 $32,325 0.86 $28,593 $5,114 $23,979 0.84
Kia-Carnival Minivan $19,884 $2,336 $17,547 0.88 $21,850 $2,954 $18,896 0.86
Ssangyong-Chairman Large-size Luxury $60,863 $6,064 $54,799 0.90 $48,050 $4,368 $43,682 0.91
Note: Post-merger marginal costs are derived with IV nested-logit post-merger demand estimation results that use
post-merger data. Only five brands listed above were consistently sold from December 1999 through December
2010 without brand terminations.
III: Post-Merger Changes in Marginal Costs
Reductions in marginal costs forms the third dimension of post-merger change58. One can expect that, once
merged, the new Hyundai–Kia would improve productivity due to merger synergy59. Unfortunately, since Korean
automobile manufactures frequently changed their product lines both before and after the merger, direct marginal
cost comparisons are difficult. Table 8 compares the marginal costs in both pre- and post-merger regimes among
brands that had been continuously sold without brand terminations. Note that I recover these marginal costs from
estimated demand elasticities, observed shares, and observed prices by using equation (6). I observe that both prices
and marginal costs increased in the post-merger regime, while the (marginal costprice ) ratio decreased.
Since direct comparisons of vehicles’ pre- and post-merger marginal costs are difficult due to frequent brand
terminations, I use the plant-level input/output data to measure marginal cost improvement. In Appendix, I
implement value-added-base production function estimations, and observe the statistically significant merger synergy
effects among Hyundai–Kia group plants. Thus, the (value-added basis) marginal production costs of Hyundai–Kia
group cars decreased after the merger, and affected post-merger vehicle prices.
IV: Post-Merger Changes in Product Lines
Product lines make up the fourth factor of post-merger change. For a merged firm, terminating intra-firm competing
products would seem to be one f the optimal strategies for increase profits. Table 9 demonstrates that a significant
number of Hyundai–Kia groups’ vehicle bands were terminated between November 1998 and November 2003 (a
period of 5 years after the merger announcement). The merged company primarily terminated brands of former
Kia Motors, and one can observe significant changes in the product line. In particular, Kia’s small- to mid-size
luxury car line underwent drastic changes, including the elimination of some of its best-selling brands. In addition,
terminated brands coincide with low-markup percentage brands in Table 6. I view these brand terminations as the
merged Hyundai–Kia groups’ differentiated product organization. In other words, a merged firm has an incentive
to terminate intra-firm competing brands to maximize profit60.
58 Post-merger marginal cost reductions, called merger synergy, are heavily debated in the homogeneous product industry merger
literature. See Gowrisankaran (1999) [17] for the literature review.
59 I had a chance to interview a former Kia Motors worker. He mentioned that Kia Motors had better large-size engine production
technologies (for SUVs and Minivans) than Hyundai did before the merger, whereas Hyundai held advantages in sedan production.
60 This topic relates to endogenous product choices (product positioning). Although I do not model endogenous differentiated-product
positioning in this paper, in the conclusion section, I will mention future extensions of this project that would examine the dynamics of
22
Table 9: Left figure: Bands supplied by Hyundai and Kia Motors in November 1998 (merger announcement month),
Right figure: Brands supplied by Hyundai-Kia groups in Nov. 2003 (five years after merger)
Observed pre-merger product line:
Brands supplied by Hyundai and Kia Motors in Nov.1998
Class Hyundai Kia
City/Small Atoz Pride (5)
City/Small
Sub-Compact Accent (12) Avella (40)
Sub-Compact
Sub-Compact
Compact Avante (2)
Compact Sephia (8)
Compact Shuma
Compact
Mid-Size Sonata (1) Credos (22)
Mid-Size
Mid-Size Luxury Grandeur (3) Potentia
Full-Size Luxury Dynasty Enterprise
Full-Size Luxury
Sports Elan
Sports Tiburon
Compact SUV/Jeep (Asia-)Retona
SUV/Jeep Gallopper (21)
Compact Crossover SUV Sportage (17)
Crossover SUV
Minivan/MPV Santamo Carnival (15)
Minivan/MPV
Compact Minivan/MPV
Observed post-merger product line:
Brands supplied by Hyundai-Kia groups in Nov.2003
Class Hyundai Kia
City/Small Atoz Pride (5)
City/Small Visto
Sub-Compact Accent (12) Avella (40)
Sub-Compact Click Rio
Sub-Compact Verna (27)
Compact Avante (2) Cerato
Compact Sephia (8)
Compact Shuma
Compact Spectra
Mid-Size Sonata (1) Credos (22)
Mid-Size Optima (30)
Mid-Size Luxury Grandeur (3) Potentia
Full-Size Luxury Dynasty Enterprise
Full-Size Luxury Equus (39) Opirus
Sports Tuscani Elan
Sports Tiburon
Compact SUV/Jeep (Asia-)Retona
SUV/Jeep Gallopper (21)
Compact Crossover SUV Terracan Sportage (17)
Crossover SUV SantaFe (7) Sorento (19)
Minivan/MPV Santamo Carnival (15)
Minivan/MPV Trajet (32)
Compact Minivan/MPV Lavita Carens (14)
A brand name with a strike-thorough indicates a brand terminated at some point during December 1998 - November
2003.
Parentheses indicate 1991–2010 top 40 sales statuses and rank.
SUV: Sports Utility Vehicle, with off-road driving ability, Minvan = MPV: Multiple Purpose Vehicle
Crossover SUV: Mixture of SUV and MPV
V: Post-Merger Product Quality Improvements
Another potential reason for vehicle price increases is product quality improvement. Although Korean automobile
manufactures suffered from a reputation for low quality during the 1980s and early 1990s, today’s automobile
consumers (both in Korea and in the United States) generally recognize Korean cars to have undergone substantial
quality improvements during the late 1990s to 2000s61. Figure 7 illustrates that, since 1992, Hyundai Sonata’s price
in the United States increased about 8 percent and Hyundai Elantra’s price increased about 11 percent. Given the
assumption that competition status in the United States’ automobile market has remained unchanged, one might
interpret such price increases as increases in quality. Thus, one could potentially attribute a portion of the price
increases in Korea to improvements in product quality. However, such quality improvements cannot be measured
product positioning.
61 Hyundai Sonata and Genesis were named Green Car Journal’s Car of The Year in 2011 and 2009.
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Figure 10: Material Cost Proxy: Importer Price Index in Korea (inflation adjusted)
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as a numerical variable in this research, and are not included in the subsequent analysis in this paper62.
VI: Post-Merger Changes in Material Costs
An increase in material costs could be a major cause of price increases. Figure 10 depicts the inflation-adjusted
Importer Price Index during 1991–2010, which roughly measures imported material costs63. I observe two spikes,
first in 1998 and then during 2008–2009. The spikes are due to the devaluation of the Korean won (in 1998 and
2009) and global material cost increases (in 2008). This figure indicates that increases in material cost could cause
rises in vehicle prices during 2008–2009. However, the effects of material cost increases (on vehicle prices) were
limited to the 2008–2009 period.
VII: Post-Merger Changes in Supply Side Competition
Change in the forms of supply side competition might contribute to long-run price deviations. The benchmark
(conventional) simulation assumes a static Bertrand price competition. However, since the merged Hyundai-Kia
group took about 70 percent of the domestic market’s share in Korea, it remains possible that firms engaged in other
forms of competition, such as leader-follower or dynamic price competitions. By observing price transitions in each
vehicle type category (see Figures 6, 14, and 15), fringe/small-scale firms (GM-Daewoo, Samsung, and Ssangyong
Motors) seem to follow Hyundai-Kia group’s prices, especially during 2006–201064. These observations suggest that
62 Note that unobserved product characteristics, ξjt’s, are not direct measures of product quality. Rather, ξjt’s are recovered as resid-
uals in equation (3), and depend on other products supplied in the market. In general, researchers rarely observe quality improvements
in data in numerical forms. A notable exception is Leslie and Jin (2003), wherein restaurant hygiene scores (measures of restaurant
qualities) are observed and policy impacts of newly introduced hygiene grade cards are investigated.
63Since Korea is not rich in natural resources, Korean manufacturing industries import materials from abroad.
64 I observe that fringe (small-scale) firms raised their vehicle prices about 2 to 6 months after the Hyundai-Kia group raised its prices.
The Edgeworth price cycle model, suggested by Maskin and Tirole (1998) and empirically analyzed by Noel (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010)
and Lewis (working paper) with gasoline industry data, may capture such price movements. In addition, these observations decrease the
likelihood of industry-wide collusion, as firms raise prices simultaneously in a situation of perfect collusion. Furthermore, dynamic price
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part of the long-run simulation price discrepancy can be explained by the changes in supply side competition.
In summary, all of the changes described above (and numerous other changes not discussed here65) are likely
to have occurred simultaneously in the post-merger regime, and thus to have contributed to vehicle prices in Korea.
In the next section, I break down the changes in consumer incomes, preferences, marginal costs, and product lines,
and investigate their contributions to discrepancies between observed and simulated prices.
7 Counterfactuals: Accounting for Long-Run Post-Merger Price Dis-
crepancies, A Partial Contribution Approach
In this section, I account for the long-run price simulation discrepancies by taking into account observed post-
merger market conditions in simulations. I realize that post-merger information is not available at the time merger
policy decisions are made, and that simulation results reported here are completely hypothetical. However, these
hypothetical simulations enable us to detect the sources of long-run simulated price discrepancies. Detected sources
provide useful information for future antitrust policymaking in which antitrust policymakers can debate factors
that should be included in post-merger price simulations. Note that the basement simulation, which uses only the
pre-merger data, relies crucially on the strong assumptions (I-1)-(IV-1). In general, one cannot expect that such
strong assumptions will hold after the merger, especially in the long run. In particular, I change the basement
assumption by using the following observed (or estimated) post-merger data.
Using Observed Post-Merger Conditions in Simulations:
(I-3) Observed post-merger consumer incomes
(II-3) Observed post-merger consumer preferences
(III-3) Observed post-merger marginal costs
(IV-3) Observed post-merger product lines
Herein I take the partial contribution (ceteris paribus) approach. In other words, I investigate contributions of
each (I-3)-(IV-3), given other factors fixed to the benchmark simulation assumptions66. In this way, I numerically
evaluate effects of each (I-3)-(IV-3) separately with the goal of contributing to future horizontal-merger policymak-
ing. In particular, I materialize post-merger information (I-3)-(IV-3) under the following conditions:
Using Observed Post-Merger Market Conditions in Simulations: Implementations
(I-4) Applying the 30.9 percent increase in quarter dummy (income proxy)
(II-4) Substituting the estimated post-merger preference parameters (αˆ, βˆ, σˆ), with using pre-merger ξjt values
(III-4) Applying a uniform 5 percent post-merger marginal cost reduction among Hyundai-Kia group’s brands
(IV-4) Applying the observed November 2007 product lines, with post-merger xjt, ξjt and mˆcjt values
competitions, put forth by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) [36] who suggest high prices during a recession, are not likely to describe this
specific industry, since I do not observe high prices during the global recession (2008-2009).
65 Such as the abilities of CEOs and effective advertisements through mass media.
66 For example, when I use (II-3), I also apply (I-1), (III-1), and (IV-1) for a post-merger price simulation.
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Table 10: Using observed post-merger changes in simulation: Partial (ceteris paribus) and total contributions
on price discrepancies
Type of post-merger projection Partial (or total) Simulated Notes:
(given other projections un-applied, contribution for post-merger
except last row) simulated post-merger aggregate
aggregate prices price
(I-4): Using only post-merger +$ 933 $17,674 30.9% increase in average of pre-
consumer income change (+25.26%) merger quarter dummies
(II-4): Using only post-merger +$2,192 $18,933 Unobserved product
consumer preference change (+59.36%) characteristics, ξˆjt’s, unchanged
(III-4): Using only post-merger -$ 499 $16,242 Uniform 5% reduction in mˆcjt’s
marginal costs changes (-13.52%) among Hyundai-Kia vehicles
(IV-4): Using only post-merger $ 269 $17,011 Using product lines in Nov. 2007
product line changes (-7.31%) with recovered post-merger ξˆjt’s
Using (I-4), (II-4), and (III-4) +$ 2,260 $19,002 Simultaneously applying
Simultaneously (multiple changes) (+61.25%) (I-4) - (III-4)
1000 won =1 US dollar exchange rate applied
Simulated prices with benchmark (conventional) assumptions (I-1)-(IV-1) is $16,741
Second column represents changes in comparison with benchmark simulated price
Percentages in the second column indicate contributions to reduce (observed long run minus simulated) price
discrepancy = $3,692 (= $20,433 - $16,741). For example (I-4) contributes 9333,692 × 100 = 25.26 percent.
Average of observed long-run (1999–2003) prices = $17,109
Average of observed long-run (2004–2010) prices = $20,433
Note that, in general, changes in consumer preference and supply-side changes in product lines are not separable.
Consumer’s preference over unobserved product characteristics ξjt depends on available products that automobile
manufactures determine to supply6768. To alleviate this non-separability problem, I have chosen the pre-merger ξjt
values used in (II-4) and post-merger ξjt values used in (IV-4).
7.1 A Ceteris Paribus (Partial Contribution) Evaluation in Post-Merger Changes
Table 10 lists the results of each partial contribution of the post-merger changes for improving (average of observed
long run minus basement simulation) price discrepancy, given other changes unapplied. I observe that consumer
income increased 30.9 percent after the Hyundai–Kia merger (see Table 7). Applying (I-4), which increases average
of pre-merger quarter dummies (income proxy) by 30.9 percent, results in a reduction of the outside goods (non-
purchase) share and a $933 increase in post-merger aggregate price. (II-4) enables an investigation on the effect of
67 I observe that more and more SUVs became available in the post-merger regime. Technically, one can decision-theoretically debate
the relationship between consumer preference and choice sets, although such discussions are not within the scope of this research.
68 I recognize product lines are endogenously determined given consumer incomes and preferences. I am currently working on another
research project that analyzes firms’ endogenous dynamic choices of differentiated products (product lines) given the perfect foresights
on consumer income and preferences.
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preference change. By substituting the estimated post-merger preferences (αˆ, βˆ, σˆ), the aggregate price increases
by $2,192. The post-merger changes in preference comprise the largest observable source of simulation discrepancy.
(III-4), a uniform 5 percent reduction in marginal costs among Hyundai-Kia vehicles69, investigates the consequences
of post-merger marginal cost improvements from the merger synergy. The simulation results indicate that these
marginal cost improvements result in an aggregate price reduction of $49970. Finally, (IV-4) investigates the impact
of product line changes. I substitute the observed November 2007 product lines, their product characteristics (both
observable and unobservable), and marginal costs. The result indicates that such product line changes increase the
aggregate price by $269. A strong caveat is required for interpreting this number. Given consumer incomes and
preferences, the product lines were endogenously determined by firms. As I discussed in the section 6, the merged
Hyundai-Kia group avoided intra-firm product competitions, and terminated some intra-firm competing products.
Such product-line organization results in the increase in aggregate price. These simulation results indicate that
changes in consumer income and preference had a substantial impact on post-merger price hikes, although supply
side changes in marginal costs and product lines also had sizable impacts.
More importantly, these post-merger changes in (I-4)-(III-4) can be applied simultaneously71, and such a sim-
ulation with simultaneous factor changes may have practical value in antitrust policymaking. With this motive
in mind, I simulate post-merger prices using (I-4)-(III-4) simultaneously. The result is a 61.24 percent ($ 2,260)
discrepancy reduction, and more than half of the discrepancy can be explained by incorporating (I-4)-(III-4). This
simulation result from simultaneous post-merger changes indicates that antitrust policy makers can benefit from
incorporating potential changes in relevant exogenous72 factors into the simulation model73.
Lastly, there remains an unexplained portion of simulation discrepancy. However, note that such post-merger
changes as product quality improvements and changes of supply side competition could explain the remaining sim-
ulation discrepancy. In particular, unobserved product quality improvements are likely to be the major component.
A consensus exists among automobile industry specialists that Korean automobile manufactures improved their
product quality throughout the 2000s74. Such quality improvements ideally should be observed and incorporated in
simulations. However, product quality improvements are, unfortunately, not numerically observed in this research
and thus remain in the unexplained discrepancy.
69 The uniform 5 percent marginal cost reductions are temporarily assumed. I am currently working on production function estimations
and recovering marginal costs using observed wage and rental rate data. Using recovered marginal production costs, I will attempt to
investigate the merger synergy effect (TFP improvement) after the Hyundai-Kia merger.
70 This result marks a contrast to the marginal cost reduction seen in perfectly substitutable homogeneous goods markets. In
a homogeneous product market with Bertrand price competition and given that marginal costs are identical, one expect a 5 percent
market price decrease with a 5 percent marginal cost reduction. In a differentiated-product market, the effects of marginal cost reductions
are weakened by imperfect substitutions.
71 Since both (IV-4) and (III-4) change marginal costs, (IV-4) cannot be applied with (III-4).
72 Exogenous to the simulation model.
73 In this case study, post-merger preference changes play the most significant role in creating long-run simulation discrepancy.
However, in other cases such as a horizontal merger in the cereal industry, post-merger supply side changes in marginal cost and product
lines could play substantial roles.
74 GM-Daewoo Motors and Renault-Samsung Motors had also improved product qualities by introducing General Motors and Renault
vehicle based automobile brands. General Motors and Renault Motors were also likely to carry over production technologies.
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Figure 11: Left figure: Applying post-merger income, Right figure: Applying post-merger preference
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Assumption IV-1: Using observed post-merger income
Original benchmark simulation
Short-term  observed price average
Long-run observed price average
Incorpolating post-merger income change
16,741
17,109
20,433
17,674
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Assumption IV-2: Using estimated post-merger preference
Original benchmark simulation
Short-term  observed price average
Long-run observed price average
Incorpolating post-merger preference
16,741
17,109
20,433
17,674
Figure 12: Left figure: Applying marginal cost reduction, Right figure: Applying post-merger product line
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Assumption IV-3: Marginal cost reduction (by 5 percent)
Original benchmark simulation
Short-term  observed price average
Long-run observed price average
Incorpolating marginal cost reduction
16,741
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20,433
16,242
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Assumption IV-4: Observed post-merger product line
Original benchmark simulation
Short-term  observed price average
Long-run observed price average
Incorpolating observed product line change
16,741
17,109
20,433
17,011
8 Conclusion and Future Extensions
This paper demonstrates empirically that the post-merger price simulation method proposed by Nevo (2000, 2001)
[31] [31] can offer reasonable performance in predicting shot-term post-merger prices, although, in this case study,
some of the simulation assumptions changed even in the short term. Nonetheless, using this simulation reveals
significant long-run discrepancies between observed and simulated prices. This research also investigates counterfac-
tual simulations, which take into account observed post-merger changes in the market. Counterfactual simulations
exemplify that changes in consumer incomes and preferences, and marginal costs can explain the majority of simu-
lation discrepancies. This ex-post evaluation of simulation performance suggests that, when antitrust policymakers
apply the results of post-merger price simulations, they must take into account possible changes in factors that the
simulation model takes as exogenous.
One can expand this research in two important directions. The first direction involves modeling supply-side
endogenous product positioning75, a currently active research area in the empirical industrial organization literature.
75 E.g.: Such differentiated-product firms as magazine publishers or beer manufactures dynamically allocate their products on the
product space. They organize their product positioning to correspond to changes in costs, government regulations, and consumer tastes.
Importantly, the effect of such policy changes as tighter environmental regulations or tax increases depends on how firms react to new
market conditions by reallocating their differentiate products. For example, market effects of the currently debated “sugar tax” depend
on how quickly food (or soda) manufacturers react to the sugar tax by changing their product lines.
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Although endogenous product-positioning76 serves as an important component of antitrust policymaking, only a
limited number of empirical investigations are currently available, especially regarding the dynamics of differentiated-
product positioning77. Sweeting (working paper) [39] stands as the pioneering researcher in this area. Due to simple
market characteristics, the Korean automobile market is advantageous when it comes to investigating supply-side
product choice dynamics.
Investigating Williamson’s trade-off with internationally competing firms serves as the second direction of possi-
ble research extension. The core of the antitrust merger debate lies in whether consumer-side welfare-reducing price
effects can be compensated for supply-side welfare-increasing productivity gains, when looked at from a perspective
of enhancing social surplus. This Williamson trade-off framework becomes extremely challenging considering the
existence of firms that engage in both domestic and international competitions, and also invest in quality improve-
ments. The trade-off problem would then become whether one can view welfare losses among domestic consumers
(that result from high the post-merger domestic market concentration) as necessary sacrifices for the productiv-
ity (and quality) increase (and subsequent welfare gains) of globally operating domestic firms. In particular, the
Hyundai–Kia group, which has extracted consumer surplus since the merger, has—at the same time—heavily in-
vested in quality, design, and manufacturing improvements78 and, furthermore, has expanded global sales79. If one
takes the social surplus maximizing point of view, post-merger welfare losses among Korean domestic automobile
buyers could be offset by Hyundai–Kia group’s global sales expansions, made possible by the improvements in pro-
ductivity and product quality80. Although I am unable to provide answers to this important social question, my
conjecture is that the merger between Hyundai and Kia Motors enhanced Korea’s overall welfare, thanks to the
large expansion of exports by the merged Hyundai-Kia group.
76 See Gandhi, Froeb, Tachantz, and Werden (2008) [16] for the theoretical frame work of post-merger differentiated-product space
organizations.
77 See Draganska, Mazzeo, and Seim (working paper) for their literature review on endogenous product choice by firms.
78 See Hyundai Motors’ financial reports: http://worldwide.hyundai.com/company-overview/investor-relations/financial-information-
statements-audited-report.html.
79 As of December 2010, Hyundai-Kia group is the forth-largest automobile manufacture in the world, following GM, Toyota, and
Volkswagen groups.
80Hyundai Motors’ famous “10 years or 100,000 miles” warranty in North America began in 1999, right after the Hyundai-Kia merger.
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Appendix 1: Data Construction Details
8.1 Categorizations for Estimation and Construction of Instrumental Variables
Based on Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) [5], I construct and use following instrumental variables.
(1) Cost shifter = kilogram × (Importer Price Index)
(2) Sum of within same class competing firm products’ size
(3) Sum of within same class competing firm products’ horsepower-per-kilogram
(4) Sum of within same class competing firm products’ kilometer-per-litter
Brand classes are listed on the table 11 8182.
81 Since SUVs, Crossover-SUVs, and Minivans have complicated classifications, I categorize them into the single category.
82 Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) also use the sum of the characteristics of other products offered by the same firm. I do not use
such instruments in this research due to concerns about endogenous product characteristic choices.
Table 11: Automobile brand classifications by firm
Class Hyundai Kia (GM-)Daewoo Ssangyong (Renault-)Samsung IV Nested-logit group categorization
City/Small Atoz Morning (16) Matiz (4) (i) Small- & Compact-size group
City/Small Visto Tico (11) (i) Small- & Compact-size group
City/Small Pride (5) (i) Small- & Compact-size group
Sub-Compact Accent (12) Avella (40) Ciero (i) Small- & Compact-size group
Sub-Compact Click Rio Gentra (i) Small- & Compact-size group
Sub-Compact Excel (10) GentraX (i) Small- & Compact-size group
Sub-Compact Verna (27) Kalos (i) Small- & Compact-size group
Sub-Compact Lanos (37) (i) Small- & Compact-size group
Sub-Compact LeMans (29) (i) Small- & Compact-size group
Compact Avante (2) Capital (38) Lacetti (31) SM3 (23) (i) Small- & Compact-size group
Compact Elantra (6) Cerato Nubira (28) (i) Small- & Compact-size group
Compact i30 Forte (i) Small- & Compact-size group
Compact Stellar Sephia (8) (i) Small- & Compact-size group
Compact Shuma (i) Small- & Compact-size group
Compact Spectra (i) Small- & Compact-size group
Mid-Size Sonata (1) Concord Espero (20) SM5 (9) (ii) Mid-size group
Mid-Size Credos (22) Leganza (33) SM518 (ii) Mid-size group
Mid-Size K5 Magnus SM520 (24) (ii) Mid-size group
Mid-Size Lotze (34) Tosca SM525 (ii) Mid-size group
Mid-Size Optima (30) (ii) Mid-size group
Mid-Size Luxury Grandeur (3) K7 Arcadia SM7 (iii) luxury group
Mid-Size Luxury Brougham (iii) luxury group
Mid-Size Luxury Imperial (iii) luxury group
Mid-Size Luxury Prince (13) (iii) luxury group
Mid-Size Luxury Salon (iii) luxury group
Full-Size Luxury Dynasty Enterprise Chairman (iii) luxury group
Full-Size Luxury Equus (39) Opirus ChairmanW (iii) luxury group
Full-Size Luxury Genesis Potentia (iii) luxury group
Sports Scoupe Elan (ii) Mid-size group
Sports Tiburon (ii) Mid-size group
Sports Tuscani (ii) Mid-size group
Compact SUV/Jeep (Asia-)Retona Family (iv) Jeep, SUV, Minivan group
Compact SUV/Jeep (Asia-)Rocsta Korando (25) (iv) Jeep, SUV, Minivan group
SUV/Jeep Gallopper (21 ) Musso (18) (iv) Jeep, SUV, Minivan group
Compact Crossover SUV Terracan Sportage (17) Winstorm Actyon QM5 (iv) Jeep, SUV, Minivan group
Compact Crossover SUV Tuscon (26) Kyron (iv) Jeep, SUV, Minivan group
Crossover SUV SantaFe (7) Sorento (19) Rexton (36) (iv) Jeep, SUV, Minivan group
Crossover SUV Luxury Veracruz Mohave (iv) Jeep, SUV, Minivan group
Minivan/MPV Santamo Carnival (15) Rodius (iv) Jeep, SUV, Minivan group
Minivan/MPV Trajet (32) Grand Carnival (iv) Jeep, SUV, Minivan group
Compact Minivan/MPV Lavita Carens (14) Rezzo (35) (iv) Jeep, SUV, Minivan group
Compact Minivan/MPV Carstar (iv) Jeep, SUV, Minivan group
Compact Minivan/MPV Soul (iv) Jeep, SUV, Minivan group
Parentheses indicate 1991-2010 top 40 sales status and rank
SUV: Sports Utility Vehicle, with off-road driving ability, MPV: Multiple Purpose Vehicle equivalent to Minivan
Crossover SUV: Mixture of SUV and MPV
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Appendix 2: Constructions of Aggregate Prices
In this appendix, I describe the construction of aggregated prices. I use two objective criteria for creating representative prices and
denoting P as aggregated price or price by firm, p as observed price, and q as observed sales quantity.
Sales Weighted Prices
The definition of sales weighted prices:
(1-1) Sales weighted aggregate prices
Paggregate,t =
∑
j∈all brands supplied at time t
[
pj,t ·
qj,t∑
j∈all brands supplied at time t qj,t
]
(1-2) Sales weighted prices by firm (ex: Hyundai Motors)
PHyundai,t =
∑
j∈all Hyundai brands supplied at time t
[
pj,t ·
qj,t∑
j∈all Hyundai brands supplied at time t qj,t
]
These prices are plotted on 9.
Indexed Prices
Index weight are defined as
wj,period =
Sales quantity of brand j in a specific period
Total sales quantity in a specific period
.
I specify the periods as (i) 1991–1995, (ii) 1996–2000, (iii) 2001–2005, (iv) 2006–2010.
I define indexed prices as:
(2-1) Indexed aggregate prices
Paggrregate,t =
∑
j∈all brands supplied at time t
pj,t · wj,perod
(2-2) Indexed prices by firm (ex: Hyundai Motors)
PHyundai,t =
∑
j∈all Hyundai brands supplied at time t
pj,t · wj,perod
I plot the indexed prices in Figure 13. Unfortunately, the prices have “jumps” at Januaries of 1996, 2001, and 2006, however, long-run
post-merger prices are clearly observed.
Figure 13: Left Figure: Indexed aggregate price, Right Figure: Indexed prices by firms
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Appendix 3: Supplemental Figures
In this section, I post supplemental figures which are not posted in the main body of the paper.
Vehicle Price Transitions
Figure 14, 15, and 16 show that vehicle prices categorized by class. There are two notable findings among these
figures:
(1) Prices did not increase immediately after the Hyundai–Kia merger in November 1998.
(2) Prices significantly increased in 2006.
(1) is caused by the following reason. In the production function estimations, I observe statistically significant Total
Factor Productivity (TFP) improvements. Thus, newly merged Hyundai-Kia group’ plants obtained merger synergy
(TFP improvement), and improved (decreased) their marginal costs. Improved marginal cost prevents Hyundai-Kia
group from increasing their vehicle prices after the merger.
Figure 14: Left figure: City-/Small-size car prices, Right figure: Subcompact car prices
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Figure 15: Left figure: Compact crossover SUV prices, Right figure: Crossover SUV prices
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Figure 16: Left figure: Compact-minivan prices, Right figure: Minivan prices
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Appendix 5: Simple Example of Nevo’s Ownership Matrix Method, and
Simulation Computation
Example: Two firms and three brands. Firm A supplies goods 1 and 2 and firm B supplies good 3. Profits for each
firm are
ΠA = (p1 −mc1)s1(p)M + (p2 −mc2)s2(p)M − CA
ΠB = (p3 −mc3)s3(p)M − CB .
First order necessary conditions are
s1(p) + (p1 −mc1)
∂s1(p)
∂p1
+ (p2 −mc2)
∂s2(p)
∂p1
= 0
(p1 −mc1)
∂s1(p)
∂p2
+ s2(p) + (p2 −mc2)
∂s2(p)
∂p2
= 0
s3(p) + (p3 −mc3)
∂s3(p)
∂p3
= 0
and 

−∂s1(p)
∂p1
−∂s2(p)
∂p1
0
−∂s1(p)
∂p2
−∂s2(p)
∂p2
0
0 0 −∂s3(p)
∂p3




p1 −mc1
p2 −mc2
p3 −mc3

 =


s1(p)
s2(p)
s3(p)

 .
Then, we obtain


p1 −mc1
p2 −mc2
p3 −mc3

 =




1 1 0
1 1 0
0 0 1

×


−∂s1(p)
∂p1
−∂s2(p)
∂p1
−∂s3(p)
∂p1
−∂s1(p)
∂p2
−∂s2(p)
∂p2
−∂s3(p)
∂p2
−∂s1(p)
∂p3
−∂s2(p)
∂p3
−∂s3(p)
∂p3




−1 

s1(p)
s2(p)
s3(p)

 .
In the paper, I solve/simulate 18 to 41 dimensional versions of this problem (since the number of supplied automobile
brands changes over time, dimensions vary).
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Appendix 6: Sales Rankings
Table 12: Top 40 Sales of Domestically-Produced Automobiles (Korea, 1991-2010)
Sales Ranking Firm Brand Classification Sales Units
(1) Hyundai Sonata Mid-Size 2,605,467
(2) Hyundai Avante Compact 1,611,615
(3) Hyundai Grandeur Mid-Size Luxury 922,587
(4) Daewoo Matiz City/Small 695,707
(5) Kia Pride Sub-Compact 622,416
(6) Hyundai Elantra Compact 580,396
(7) Hyundai SantaFe Crossover SUV 580,368
(8) Kia Sephia Compact 539,333
(9) Samsung SM5 Mid-Size 458,776
(10) Hyundai Excel Sub-Compact 416,273
(11) Daewoo Tico Citi/Small 415,096
(12) Hyundai Accent Sub-Compact 406,960
(13) Daewoo Prince Mid-Size Luxury 392,454
(14) Kia Carens Compact Minivan/MPV 388,042
(15) Kia Carnival Minivan/MPV 383,575
(16) Kia Morning City/Small 371,513
(17) Kia Sportage Compact Crossover SUV 345,148
(18) Ssangyong Musso SUV/Jeep 326,968
(19) Kia Sorento Crossover SUV 321,001
(20) Daewoo Espero Mid-Size 306,941
(21) Hyundai Galloper Compact SUV/Jeep 306,596
(22) Kia Credos Mid-size 275,958
(23) Samsung SM3 Compact 275,817
(24) Samsung SM520 Mid-Size 272,851
(25) Ssanyong Korando Compact SUV/Jeep 271,229
(26) Hyundai Tucson Compact Crossover SUV 255,510
(27) Hyundai Verna Sub-Compact 253,494
(28) Daewoo Nubira Compact 243,718
(29) Daewoo LeMans Sub-Compact 238,527
(30) Kia Optima Mid-Size 218,665
(31) Daewoo Lacetti Compact 193,286
(32) Hyundai Trajet Minivan/MPV 191,767
(33) Daewoo Leganza Mid-Size 189,380
(34) Kia Lotze Mid-Sise 188,236
(35) Daewoo Rezzo Compact Minivan/MPV 180,463
(36) Ssangyong Rexton Crossover SUV 172,386
(37) Daewoo Lanos Sub-Compact 166,032
(38) Kia Capital Compact 153,090
(39) Hyundai Equus Full-Size Luxury 150,171
(40) Kia Avella Sub-Compact 138,099
37
Appendix 4: Measuring Merger Synergy by Estimating a Production
Function and Recovering Production Marginal Costs
In this appendix, I estimate a automobile-plant-level production function and examine the Hyudai-Kia merger’s
synergy. As mentioned in the paper, the direct comparisons of pre- and post-merger marginal costs are difficult
because Korean automobile manufactures changed their product lines largely. Alternatively, I directly measure the
Total Factor Productivity (henceforth TFP) changes before and after the Hyundai-Kia merger.
Plant Level Data
Production and cost functions are estimated with data from Korean Annual Mining and Manufacturing Survey
which contains annual plant level data83. The plant information is summarized in Table 13.
Firms’ Cost Minimization Problem
I assume a production function has the Cobb-Douglas form Y = f(K,L) = AKαkLαl where Y is a value added, A
is a TFP, K is a value of capital equipment (includes building, structure, machine, vessels and vehicles, etc), and L
is the number of total labor hours. Given an amount of production Y , a firm solves the cost minimization problem
min
K,L
{rK + wL} s.t. Y = AKαkLαl .
83 The data is available from http://kostat.go.kr. Unfortunately, this dataset does not have plant id indicators. However, because of
small number of automobile assembling plants in South Korea, I was able to pin down plants’ identities by matching their province/city
locations, plant establishment years, and end/beginning of year number of labors. Xu also use the same survey data (for Electric Motor
Industry) to construct his technology diffusion model.
Table 13: List of automobile plants in Korea
Plant Number Plant ownership Location Sampling years produced brand (in the calendar year of 2004)
1 Daewoo→GM Daewoo Incheon-Greater-City 1992 - 2009 Cielo, Lanos, Leganza
2 Daewoo→GM Daewoo Gusan, Jeolla-Buk-Province 1997 - 2009 Magnus, Nubira, Rezzo
3 Daewoo Truck→Tata Daewoo Gunsan, Jeolla-Buk-Province 1995 - 2009 Commercial Truck
4 Daewoo→GM Daewoo Changwon, Gyeong-San-Nam-Province 1992 - 2009 Matiz, Tico
5 Hyundai Ulsan-Greater-City 1992 - 2009 Atoz, Avante, Dynasty, Equus, Galloper, Grandeur,
Santa-Fe, Santamo, Sonata, Sportage,
Tiburon, Verna, Visto, Kia-Carstar
6 Hyundai Asan, Chung-Cheon-Nam-Province 1996 - 2009 Dynasty, Equus, Grandeur, Tiburon
7 Hyundai Jeonju, Jeolla-Buk-Province 1995 - 2009 Buses, Commercial Trucks
8 Kia Hwaseong, Gyeong-Di-Province 1992 - 2009 Shuma, Optima, Carens, Sephia, Sorento, Opirus
9 Kia Gwangju Greater-City 1992 - 2008 N.A.
10 Asia→Kia Gwangju-Greater-City 1992 - 2009 Commercial Trucks
11 Kia Sohari, Gyeong-Gi-Province 1992 - 2009 Carnival, Rio
12 Samsung Busan-Greater-City 1998 - 2009 SM3, SM5, SM7
13 Samsung Daegu-Greater-City 1998 - 2000 Commercial Trucks
14 Ssangyong Pyeongteak, Gyong-Gi-Do 1992 - 2009 Chairman, Korando, Musso, Rexton
Data Source: Firm websites (ownership), Korea Mining and Manufacturing Survey (location and sampling years), Ward’s Automotive
Yearbook (produced vehicle brand)
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Table 14: Production function estimation results
(Sample size = 211) Fixed-effect Random-effect Olley-Pakes
Hyundai-Kia merger synergy dummy 0.5288425** 0.7764618**
(0.1629887) (0.1305422)
Log of capitals: kjpT 0.2493353** 0.2768914**
(0.0686254) (0.0667296)
Log of labor hours: ljpT 0.7767417** 0.7786819**
(0.073964 ) (0.0733462)
Year 1994-1995 dummy 0.1845082 0.1720114
(0.2199425) (0.2265514)
Year 1996-1997 dummy 0.6856387** 0.7152682**
(0.2069489) (0.2129984)
Year 1998-1999 dummy 0.0691629 0.0380033
(0.2149192) (0.2195961)
Year 2000-2001 dummy 0.3862698* 0.3030461
(0.2245226) (0.2238168)
Year 2002-2003 dummy 0.9488245** 0.8473274
(0.2300275) (0.2310227)
Year 2004-2005 dummy 0.8188824** 0.716725**
(0.226336) (0.2262378)
Year 2006-2007 dummy 1.413632** 1.443058**
(0.2067615) (0.2128381)
Year 2008-2009 dummy 1.276235** 1.307849**
(0.2081042) (0.2141733)
Constant -3.818104** -4.230903**
(0.5081779) (0.500086)
Note: Basement years for dummy variables are 1991-1992. Random effect model is rejected by the Hausman test
It is trivial that this minimization problem provides the following well-known Cobb-Douglas cost and marginal cost
functions
C(r, w, Y ) =
(
Y
A
) 1
αk+αl
·
[(
αk
αl
) αl
αk+αl
+
(
αl
αk
) αk
αk+αl
]
· r
αk
αk+αl · w
αw
αk+αl
MC(r, w, Y ) =
1
αk + αl
·
1
Y
· C(r, w, Y )
Production Function Estimation
For estimation, we assume the production function is
YjpT = AjK
αk
jpTL
αl
jpT exp(εjpT )
By taking natural logarithm, we have
yjpT = aj + αkkjpT + αlljpT + εjpT
where I define yjpT = log YjpT , ajpT = logAj , kjpT = logKjpT , ljpT = logLjpT . Note that I use firm level
heterogeneity term aj which is different from plant level heterogeneity. It is ideal to estimate both firm and plant
level heterogeneities, although the small sample size restricts such possibilities.
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Figure 17: Left figure: Bank-to-firm loan rates in Korea, Right figure: Manufacturing sector hourly wage in Korea
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010
Lo
an
 R
at
es
 (P
erc
en
tag
e)
Year/Month
Hyundai-Kia
Merger Announcement->
Loan rates in Korea (Borrowing from banks)
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 14
 1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002  2004  2006  2008  2010
H
ou
rly
 W
ag
e 
(in
 th
ou
sa
nd
 w
on
)
Year/Month
Hyundai-Kia
Merger Announcement->
Manufacturing sector average hourly wages in Korea
Data Source: Bank of Korea, Statistics Korea (Korea’s national bureaus of statistics)
Table14 shows estimation results84. I confirmed significant merger synergy (increase in TFP) after the Hyundai-
Kia merger. Potential causes of this merger synergy are (1) technology diffusions among merged Hyunai-Kia group
plants, (2) reallocations of capital resources, (3) sharing vehicle parts, and (4) organizational improvements in
production systems.
Loan Rates and Worker Wages
Table 17 contains bank-to-firm loan rates and manufacturing sector worker wage in Korea (hourly wages). Loan
rates decreased after the Hyundai-Kia merger, while hourly wages have kept increasing.
84 I am currently working on organizing plant-level investment data to implement the production function estimation method proposed
by Olley-Pakes [33].
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